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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research argues that large non-controlling shareholders enhance firm value because they 
deter expropriation by the controlling shareholder. We propose that the conflicting incentives 
faced by large shareholders may induce a nonlinear relationship between the relative size of  large 
shareholdings and firm value. Consistent with this prediction, we present evidence that there are 
costs of  having a second (and third) largest shareholder, especially when the largest 
shareholdings are similar in size. Our results are robust to various relative size proxies, firm 
performance measures, model specifications, and potential endogeneity issues. 
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1. Introduction 
Large non-controlling shareholders are important guardians of  minority shareholder interests 
and can enhance firm value through their monitoring activity (Pagano and Röell, 1998, 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000, Maury and Pajuste, 2005, Laeven and Levine, 2008, Attig et al., 
2009a). We show that these shareholders may, instead, choose to collude with the controlling 
shareholder if  it is in their mutual interests. Further, the choice of  whether to monitor or collude 
will depend upon the ratio of  the controlling shareholder investment to that of  other large non-
controlling shareholders. We refer to this as the Ownership Wedge (OW).1 
Large non-controlling shareholders have the potential to play two roles. They have the 
incentive and voting power to constrain the objectives of  the controlling shareholder (Gomes 
and Navaes, 2006)2, but they may also join the controlling shareholder in expropriating wealth 
from smaller shareholders.   
We propose a simple model that captures the contrasting incentives of  the second largest 
shareholder. When the controlling shareholder·V LQYHVWPHQW LV PXFK bigger than that of  the 
second largest shareholder (that is, when OW is large), any increase in the second largest 
VKDUHKROGHU·V LQYHVWPHQW will lead to an increase in firm value. However, as the relative 
shareholdings converge in size (when OW approaches 1), firm value will fall as a result of  
collusion. This is because the private benefits from monitoring and collusion vary with the 
ownership wedge, OW. 
We contribute to the literature by testing the proposition that firm value is affected by a 
                                                 
1Other terms have been used to represent this concept. Maury and Pajuste (2005) use ´FRQWUROFRQWHVWDELOLW\µDQG
´GLVWULEXWLRQRI YRWLQJULJKWVDPRQJODUJHVKDUHKROGHUVµWRUHSUHVHQWWKH large shareholder ownership differential. 
/DHYHQDQG/HYLQHXVH´GLVWULEXWLRQRI FDVK-flow ULJKWVDPRQJODUJHVKDUHKROGHUVµ. 
2 Gomes and Novaes (2006) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) both argue that multiple large shareholders 
reduce the level of  minority expropriation. Whereas Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) focus on the formation 
process of  the controlling group, Gomes and Novaes (2006) concentrate on the ex-post bargaining games among a 
controlling coalition. 
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trade-off  between the monitoring and collusion incentives of  non-controlling large shareholders. 
Using a number of  different relative shareholder size metrics, we show that the relationship 
between the Ownership Wedge (OW) and firm value (both 7RELQ·V4DQG0DUNHW-to-Book Value) 
is concave. ,Q SDUWLFXODU ILUP YDOXH LV DW LWV JUHDWHVW ZKHQ WKH VHFRQG ODUJHVW VKDUHKROGHU·V
holding is about forty per cent of  the controlling VKDUHKROGHU·VKROGLQJ. 
Using a comprehensive sample of  Chinese firms between 2003 and 2011, we present 
clear evidence of  a non-linear relationship between the Ownership Wedge and firm value.  
Turning points in this relationship are directly related to board quorum and majority voting 
thresholds, suggesting that large shareholders take advantage of  corporate governance 
regulations when exercising their power to influence management behaviour.  Our results hold 
true irrespective of  the way in which large shareholders and shareholder identities are defined, 
and are robust to endogeneity, model specification, variable proxies, and regulatory changes.  
We focus specifically on Chinese listed companies for two reasons.  First, multiple large 
shareholders are a common phenomenon in Chinese markets. More than 49 per cent (30 per 
cent) of  listed companies have at least two large shareholders when using a 5 per cent (10 per 
cent) ownership threshold. Second, minority shareholder expropriation is pervasive, and occurs 
through mechanisms such as related party transactions (Cheung et al., 2009), inter-corporate 
loans (Jiang et al., 2010), extraordinary dividends (Lee and Xiao, 2004, Chen et al., 2009a), and 
related party loan guarantees (Berkman et al., 2009), all frequently used by controlling owners. 
By focusing on Chinese listed companies, we expand the research on the association 
between large shareholders and firm performance in a non-Western context. Previous literature 
investigates this issue for Europe (Laeven and Levine, 2008, Jara-Bertin et al., 2008, Attig et al., 
2008), East Asia (Attig et al., 2008, Attig et al., 2009a), Finland (Maury and Pajuste, 2005), Italy 
(Gianfrate, 2007), Columbia (Gutiérrez and Pombo, 2009), Spain (Gutierrez and Tribo, 2003), 
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Switzerland (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2009), and France (Belot, 2008). To the best of  our 
knowledge, no attention has been paid to Chinese listed companies, which operate in an 
environment where tunnelling and other forms of  expropriation are common. 
The rest of  the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief  literature 
review, which leads to the development of  our core propositions.  Section 3 describes the data 
and methodology. Section 4 presents our core empirical results and robustness checks. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
In recent years, the literature on multiple large shareholders has grown substantially. By 
their very nature, multiple large shareholders have an influence on all dimensions of  corporate 
strategy, which is reflected in the breadth of  topics that have been investigated in the literature.  
For example, Bolton and Thadden (1998) examine their influence on market liquidity; Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) analyze profit diversion when a firm has several large shareholders; Dhillon and 
Rossetto (2009) explore how large shareholders affect firm-level investment policy; and Edmans 
and Manso (2011) investigate their role in enforcing managerial discipline. Other papers have 
considered control contestability (Bloch and Hege, 2003), business decision approvals (Gomes 
and Navaes, 2006), monitoring of  the controlling shareholder (Winton, 1993, Pagano and Röell, 
1998, Bolton and Thadden, 1998), and private benefits of  control (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000, Zwiebel, 1995, Gomes and Navaes, 2006, Pagano and Röell, 1998). Finally, the literature 
has also examined the indirect effect of  multiple large shareholders, including their influence on 
operating performance (e.g., Gutiérrez and Pombo, 2009, Gutierrez and Tribo, 2003, Isakov and 
Weisskopf, 2009, Lehmann and Weigand, 2000), expropriation (e.g., Gianfrate, 2007), equity 
costs (e.g., Attig et al., 2008), cash holdings (e.g., Attig et al., 2009b), dividend policy (e.g., 
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Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006, Faccio et al., 2001), and managerial turnover (e.g., Volpin, 2002).  
The papers that are most closely connected to this paper are those that analyse how 
multiple large shareholders affect firm value. Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Attig et al. (2009a) 
examine the effect of  voting rights on Finnish and East Asian firms respectively, while Laeven 
and Levine (2008) look at the influence of  large shareholder cash-flow rights on European firm 
value. All three studies highlight the positive impact of  multiple large shareholders. 
One way that large shareholders can affect firm behaviour is by engaging with the 
controlling owner. Because their investment is substantial, large non-controlling shareholders will 
suffer a greater loss from expropriation than smaller shareholders. Consequently, large 
shareholders have an incentive to monitor and constrain any activity that harms shareholder 
wealth. The ability to monitor its effectiveness increases with the size of  their investment in the 
firm, therefore the existence of  several large shareholders may result in lower agency costs and 
an increase in firm performance. 
At the same time, it may be more profitable for large shareholders to collude and extract 
private rents that maximise their personal wealth collectively at the expense of  other 
shareholders. Collusion can manifest itself  through tunnelling, expropriation, related party 
transactions and the appointment of  sympathetic executives. When large shareholders collude, 
firm value will be lower compared to when large shareholders act as monitors.3 
To give some context, an anecdotal example of  collusion in the Chinese environment is 
Miangao (Stock Code: 600139), a listed company on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  Miangao has 
two large shareholders: Gaoxing Investment (holding 28.94%) and Sichuan Dingtian Group 
(holding $FFRUGLQJWRWKHILUP·VILQDQFLDOUHSRUWVDSSUR[LPDWHO\RQHTXDUWHURI 
                                                 
3 An alternative explanation is that large shareholders of  similar size may compete for private benefits.  A special 
case has been studied in the context of  second generation family firms by Bertrand et al. (2008). 
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0LDQJDR·VWRWDODVVHWVPLOOLRQ50%ZHUHUHFRUGHGDV¶2WKHU'HEWRU·.  Examination of  this 
figure reveals it consisted of  loans to the two largest shareholders and their affiliations.  Over 61 
million RMB was later written off  by the firm in the form of  bad loans, and this preceded a 75 
per cent decline in the stock price within 4 years.  Although there is no direct evidence of  
collusion, the extent of  resource diversion provides little support for the notion that the 
FRQWUROOLQJRZQHU·Vbehavior was constrained by other large shareholders.   
In Appendix A, we propose a simple model to quantify the effect of  competing behavior 
(monitoring and collusion) which provides the theoretical foundation for investigating the 
relationship between large shareholders and their effect on firm value. Given the discussions 
above and Proposition A.1 in the appendix, we hypothesize that firm value is a non-linear and 
concave function of  the ownership wedge. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
The sample period runs from 2003 to 2011 and the data is drawn from the CSMAR database 
provided by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company, a major Chinese data provider. 
Information not available on the CSMAR database is collected manually from annual reports.  
Our main variable is the relative size of  shareholdings between the first and second largest 
shareholder (Ownership Wedge). 
The initial sample includes every listed firm on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. After excluding financial firms and those with missing values, the final number of  
firm year observations is 11,241, which represents 94.04% of  the total possible firm years 
available. All variables are subsequently winsorized at the 1st  and 99th percentiles to alleviate the 
influence of  extreme outliers. A full list and definition of  variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table I gives a summary of  the ownership structure of  Chinese listed companies during 
the sample period. The two panels represent different voting right thresholds (five and ten per 
cent) to identify a large shareholder. It is clear that a high proportion of  Chinese firms have 
multiple large shareholders. For example, more than 49 per cent (30 per cent) of  firms have at 
least two large shareholders with voting rights above 5 per cent (10 per cent). 
3.1 Methodology  
A major issue facing panel data research is unobserved heterogeneity. Accordingly, we follow 
Gormley and Matsa (2014) and use an OLS regression with industry and year fixed effects as the 
main model specification.  For robustness, we also carry out an OLS regression with firm and 
year fixed effects.4  The main model specification is as follows: 
ܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ߚଶܱ ௜ܹ௧ଶ ൅  ? ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௜௧௞௡௞ୀଷ ൅ ௦݂ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (1) 
where the dependent variable is unadjusted (raw) 7RELQ·V 4 DQG WKH LQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOHV
include a linear and quadratic Ownership Wedge variable, together with various firm 
characteristics as control variables. The term ௦݂  represents industry fixed effects, ߜ௧  represents 
year fixed effects, and is the stochastic error term. 
3.1.1 Dependent Variables 
We use 7RELQ·V4as a market-based proxy of  relative firm value (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
It is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by the replacement cost of  total assets. 
However, since data on the replacement cost of  assets and market value of  debt is not available, 
we substitute the book value of  debt for its market value (Coles et al., 2008).  This also avoids 
the use of  ad hoc assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates, which the original formula 
requires.  Chung and Pruitt (1994) find that this approximation accounts for more than 95 per 
                                                 
4 We thank the referee for their suggestion in dealing with this issue.  
itH
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cent of  the variation of  the original 7RELQ·V4. 
An important characteristic of  the Chinese stock markets is that there are two types of  
shares: tradable and non-tradable. Non-tradable shares, on average, account for around 40 per 
cent of  total equity during the sample period, although this decreases over time due to the split 
share structure reforms introduced at the end of  2005. Chen and Xiong (2001) find that non-
tradable stock is between 78 and 85 per cent of  the value of  tradable stock. Following Bai et al. 
(2004), we discount the market value of  non-tradable shares by 70 and 80 per cent of  the 
tradable stock price to create two ToELQ·V 4 measures respectively5 and adjust equity value by 
weighting each share class by the number of  shares outstanding.  
3.1.2 Ownership Structure Variables 
Previous research on ownership concentration has used a number of  measures to proxy for 
shareholder power (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008).  To capture our idea of  
an Ownership Wedge, we construct four proxies: 
OW1=Votes2/Votes1         (2) 
OW2=Votes2/(Votes1+ Votes2)        (3) 
OW3=(Votes2 +Votes3)/Votes1        (4) 
OW4=(Votes2 +Votes3)/(Votes1 +Votes2 +Votes3)       (5) 
Where Votesi is the percentage voting right for the i
th largest shareholder.  OW1 and OW2 measure 
the Ownership Wedge between the first and second largest shareholder, while OW3 and OW4 
include the third largest shareholder. 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
We choose control variables on the basis of  their importance in explaining relative firm value in 
                                                 
5To calculate the value of  non-tradable shares, we multiply the discounted price per share by the total number of  
non-tradable shares. This adjustment is robust to the effect of  the split share structure reforms at the end of  2005.  
Since then, the total number of  non-tradable shareholders for each company has decreased gradually and, as a result, 
the proportion of  shares on which the discount is applied also decreases.   
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previous research (Porta et al., 2002, Claessens et al., 2002, Faccio et al., 2001, Laeven and Levine, 
2008). Firm size, FIRMSIZE, is defined as the natural logarithm of  total sales at the end of  the 
year. Leverage, LEVERAGE, is the book value of  all long-term liabilities divided by the book 
value of  total assets. Sales growth, GROWTH, is the percentage change in sales year-on-year. 
The investment ratio, CAPEX, is the ratio of  capital expenditures to total assets. Finally, 
tangibility, TANGIBILITY, is the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
From Table II, the largest shareholder owns, on average, 37.79 per cent of  total equity, followed 
by the second largest shareholder with a 7.68 per cent ownership stake.  There is, however, a 
large variation in ownership for both the largest and second largest shareholder, which results in 
a full array of  possible Ownership Wedge values. On average, the holding of  the second largest 
shareholder is 27.94 per cent that RI  WKH FRQWUROOLQJ RZQHU·V KROGLQJV OW1 = 0.2794). 
Furthermore, the Ownership Wedge (OW1) ranges from 0.0027 to 0.9826, which spans the 
domain of  all possible values. The average combined ownership stake of  both the second and 
third largest shareholders (OW3) is about 40 per cent of  the controlling shareholder·VLQYHVWPHQW
with a similar broad range in values.  
7KH PHDQ 7RELQ·V 4 7RELQ·V 41 = 1.6897 and 7RELQ·V 42 = 1.7535) is notably lower 
than previous studies (Bai et al., 2004; Wei et al., 2005).6 This is primarily because of  different 
sample periods and WKH FRUUHFWLRQZH LPSRVHRQ WKH7RELQ·V4QXPHUDWRU WR LQFRUSRUDWH WKH
pervasive non-tradable discount in Chinese equities.  
Most firms in the sample have very little external debt financing, which is consistent with 
prior research on Chinese firms (Wei et al., 2005).  The average sales growth rate is around 25 
                                                 
6 7KHDYHUDJH7RELQ·V4LQ:HLHWDOLVDQGin Bai et al (2004) is 2.99.   
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per cent each year, and is higher than western countries where sales growth has been 
approximately 13 per cent each year (Laeven and Levine, 2008). The average annual investment 
ratio is 6 per cent and the average ratio of  fixed assets to total assets is similar to previous studies 
at 29 per cent (Maury and Pajuste, 2005).  
Because of  the Chinese business environment, majority of  our sample (62.47%) has a 
large state shareholder.  In addition, 40 per cent of  our sample firms have similar large 
shareholder type (that is, large shareholders come from the same investor type of  state-owned-
enterprises, financial institutions, corporate owners, or individual investors). There are, on 
average, nine or ten directors in a firm, 35 per cent of  whom are independent. The vast majority 
of  firms split the role of  chairman and chief  executive, with only 12 per cent having one person 
covering both responsibilities. 65 per cent of  firms have all four board committees (audit, 
nomination, strategy, and remuneration) and 9.94 per cent have more than one class of  shares. 
Most firms hire local accountants as their auditors, with only 7.16 per cent of  the sample having 
Big 4 auditors (DeloitteKPMGPricewaterhouseCoopersDQGErnst & Young). 
Pairwise correlations between the main independent variables are less than 0.4, which 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a severe issue. We also calculate the variance inflation factor 
in each regression model, all of  which are less than ten, reassuring us that multicollinearity does 
not affect our analysis in a significant way.  
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
In this section, we extend the univariate analysis to further investigate the relationship between a 
ILUP·VOwnership Wedge DQG7RELQ·V4 7. Table III presents the results of  an OLS regression 
with industry and year fixed effects for TRELQ·VQ. The results show a very clear non-linear and 
concave relationship between the Ownership Wedge and firm value. In every model, the linear 
                                                 
7 )RU WKH SXUSRVHV RI  EUHYLW\ ZH RQO\ UHSRUW WKH UHVXOWV IRU 7RELQ·V 41 and drop the subscript. Full results are 
available on request.  
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OW coefficient is positive and statistically significant, whereas the quadratic OW coefficient is 
statistically significant and negative. This is as predicted in Appendix A.1 and provides 
convincing support for our main hypothesis.  
In Table III (bottom row), we present the turning points at which the relative holdings 
of  the largest investors (OW) have an optimal impact on firm value. Assuming that the optimal 
ownership range lies between those predicted by OW1 and OW2, firm value is maximised when 
OW is between 24.29% and 42.81%. The average proportionate holdings of  the controlling 
shareholder are 37.79% in our sample, so the turning points represent an actual optimal 
ownership range for the second largest shareholder of  between 16.18% (=42.81% x 37.79%) for 
OW1 and 12.12% (=24.29%/(1-24.29%) x 37.79%) for OW2.   
These turning points are consistent with the quorum requirements and majority voting 
regulations as stipulated in the Chinese Corporate Law. These laws require that only individuals 
or groups having more than a combined 10 per cent shareholding can call an extraordinary 
general meeting (EGM). It is perhaps coincidence that the optimal ownership level for the 
second largest shareholder is slightly above the 10 per cent EGM threshold, but it does offer an 
insight into when and how large shareholders exert power over boards to increase firm value.  
Further insight into the costs of  large ownership can be gained from another Chinese 
regulation that requires more than 50 per cent of  attending shareholderV· votes in order to pass a 
general resolution, such as new share issues and changes of  directors.  Additionally, for special 
motions that involve changes in registered capital, mergers and acquisitions, or other corporate 
restructuring, more than two-thirds of  votes at the general meeting must be in support of  the 
motion.8  Since the average controlling shareholding is 37.79%, the controlling owner would 
require an additional minimum of  12.21% (=50% ² 37.79%) and 28.88% (=66.67% ² 37.79%) 
                                                 
8Chinese Corporate Law 2004 and 2006 
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votes from other shareholders to pass a general and special motion respectively if  every investor 
is in attendance.  From Table III (bottom row) the optimal Ownership Wedge is when the 
combined second and third largest shareholderV·LQYHVWPHQWLV(for OW3) 70.92% and (for OW4) 
33.30%. Again, with an average controlling shareholding of  37.79% and assuming that the 
optimal ownership range lies between those predicted by OW3 and OW4, this corresponds to a 
combined optimal ownership level of  between 26.80% (=70.92% x 37.79%) and 18.87% 
(=33.30%/(1-33.30%) x 37.79%). Aggregating all optimal holdings in the top three investors 
takes total ownership to between 56.66% (=37.79% + 18.87%) and 64.59% (=37.79% + 
26.80%), which passes the thresholds to control general meeting decisions as discussed above. 
Further, these calculations assume that all shareholders cast their votes at a general meeting. 
When fewer votes are cast, the percentage ownership required for obtaining effective control will 
be lower. 
Looking at other variables, most have the expected signs. The dummy variable for state 
ownership is significantly negative in all regressions, suggesting that government ownership 
destroys shareholder value. This is also evidenced in related work by Megginson and Netter 
(2001) and Wei et al., (2005). Larger firms and those with lower sales growth have a smaller 
7RELQ·V4UHIOHFWLQJSRRUJURZWKRSSRUWXQLWLHV(e.g., La Porta et al., 2002). The only surprise is 
the tangibility variable (i.e. the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets), which is significantly positive. 
Firms with high levels of  intangibles are normally associated with growth opportunities and 
KLJKHU7RELQ·V4+RZHYHULQHPHUJLQJPDUNHWHQYLURQPHQWVVuch as China, more weight may 
be placed on actual physical resources because of  the difficulty in estimating intangible assets or 
in realizing their value.  
4.3 Further analysis 
We now consider the impact of  large shareholders from several perspectives. First, we consider 
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the threshold for classifying the second largest shareholder. Second, we look at the effect of  
shareholder identity (i.e. institution, corporation, family, or state).  Finally, we study a potential 
underlying collusion mechanism by examining related party transactions involving the largest 
shareholders.   
4.3.1 The Definition of  Second Largest Shareholder  
There is very little agreement in the literature on what defines a large shareholder.  For example, 
a 10 per cent blockholding is used by Maury and Pajuste (2005), Laeven and Levine (2008), and 
Faccio and Lang (2002). Alternatively, Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006), and 
Holderness (2009) use 5 per cent.  Our tests in the previous section suggest that the second 
largest shareholder·VLPSDFW on firm value is non-monotonic, and therefore the choice of  cut-off  
point has important implications on the findings. We, therefore, demonstrate the value impact of  
the second largest shareholder for a number of  different ownership thresholds with the 
following regression:  
ܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏ ?ܳ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦܷܯ ?ܮܵ ?ܰ ൅ ෍ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௜௧௞௡௞ୀଶ ൅ ߟ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ሺ ?ሻ 
where the dependent variable is 7RELQ·V4DQGWKHFRQWURO variables are as before. What is new in 
equation (6) is the dummy variable, DUM_LS_N, which is equal to one if  the second largest 
shareholder has an ownership stake greater than a specific threshold (i.e., 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, or 
20 per cent), and zero otherwise.  
Table IV presents the results. The main insight is that there are different effects of  a 
non-FRQWUROOLQJODUJHVKDUHKROGHURQ7RELQ·V4:KHQthe large shareholding threshold is 2 per 
cent or lower (Models [1] ² [3]), the DUM_LS variable is positive and significant in our 
regressions.  However, for ownership threshold of  5 per cent and higher (Models [5] ² [8]), the 
DUM_LS variable is significantly negative. The coefficient flip from positive to negative for the 
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DUM_LS variable provides further support for the humped relationship between the Ownership 
Wedge and 7RELQ·V4.  The signs of  all other control variable coefficients are as expected.  
4.3.2 Shareholder Identities  
Although our hypothesis makes no distinction between shareholder types, prior studies note that 
shareholder type is important for understanding corporate behavior (e.g., Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988, Volpin, 2002). Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Jara-Bertin et al. (2008) argue that 
shareholder coalitions are less likely among heterogeneous shareholder groups. For example, it is 
difficult for family shareholders and institutional investors to collude because regulatory 
supervision and the opportunity costs of  engaging in expropriation are significantly higher for 
financial institutions. In contrast, similar large shareholder groups are more likely to work 
together because they share common interests (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000, Laeven and 
Levine, 2008). 
If  similar shareholder groups are more likely to collude, we would expect to see a lower 
7RELQ·V 4 LQ WKose firms where large shareholders have the same objectives.  To test this 
hypothesis, we add one new dummy variable, IDSAME, to the empirical model.  
ܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ߚଶܱ ௜ܹ௧ଶ ൅ ߚଷܫܦܵܣܯܧ௜௧ ൅  ? ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௜௧௞௡௞ୀସ ൅ ௦݂ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (7) 
TKH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH LV 7RELQ·V 4 DQG WKH LQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOHV are as before. The new 
variable, IDSAME, equals one if  the type of  the first largest shareholder is the same as that of  
the second largest shareholder, and zero otherwise. The four shareholder types are private 
investors (including families), corporate owners, financial institutions, and the state. This dummy 
YDULDEOH FDSWXUHVGLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKHPHDQ7RELQ·V4 LI  WKH WZR ODUJHVW VKDUHKROGHUV DUH of  the 
same investor type.  
Table V reports the regression results for equation (7).  All IDSAME coefficients are 
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significantly negative, consistent with the proposition that rent-seeking collusion is more likely 
among similar large shareholders (Maury and Pajuste, 2005).  Importantly, Table V also shows 
that the OW and OW2 coefficients are unchanged in sign and statistical significance.   
4.3.3 Related Party Transactions 
 
Related party transactions are an effective avenue through which large shareholders can 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (see, e.g., Peng et al., (2011), Jiang et al., (2010) 
Cheung et al., (2009), Dahya et al., (2008)). We, therefore, collect the related party transactions of  
the largest shareholder (and its affiliates) to ascertain the likelihood of  expropriation at different 
levels of  relative large shareholdings.  
We would expect related party transactions to be minimal when the power of  monitoring 
is at its greatest and higher when collusion is more likely. If  our model is appropriate, the 
relationship between the Ownership Wedge and the likelihood of  expropriation will be convex. 
Table VI reports the results of  Probit model estimations, where the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes the value of  1 if  related party transactions occur between a listed company 
and its largest shareholder (or its affiliates), and zero otherwise. The regression results strongly 
support the above argument, and the linear coefficient of  the Ownership Wedge is negative 
while that of  the quadratic term is positive.  
4.4 Robustness Tests 
In this section, we address a number of  econometric issues that may affect the robustness of  our 
results. Specifically, we consider (1) endogeneity of  the main variables; (2) the appropriateness of  
our model specification; (3) alternative performance measures; (4) alternative relative size 
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measurements; and (5) the effect of  the split share structure reform.9  
4.4.1 Endogeneity  
We use a number of  approaches to address whether endogeneity is an issue in our analysis.  First, 
we follow Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) in using lagged 
ownership variables of  up to three years as instruments within a 2SLS empirical design. Second, 
we consider a number of  possible omitted variables, including dual class shares (Bai et al., 2004); 
board size (Yermack, 1996, Eisenberg et al., 1998, Mak and Kusnadi, 2005); the proportion of  
independent directors on the board (Dahya et al., 2008); whether a firm has the full suite of  
board sub-committees (audit, nomination, strategy, and remuneration committees); whether a 
firm has a Big Four auditor (Fan and Wong 2005); and whether the firm splits the role of  
chairman and CEO (Dey et al., 2011). Our main results are unchanged. 
We also investigate whether ownership structure is a function of  the past expropriation 
behavior of  controlling shareholders through using a dynamic panel estimation methodology, i.e., 
system GMM. To justify how many firm value lags are sufficient to ensure dynamic completeness, 
we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and run a regression of  current firm value on five lags of  past 
firm value, controlling for other firm-specific characteristics. System GMM estimation of  the 
core model is presented in Table VII. Similar to earlier results, the coefficients for the OW and 
OW2 across most models are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level with the expected signs. 
This supports our main results.  
4.4.2 Model Specification 
Several alternative model specifications are considered. We use OLS regressions with firm and 
year fixed effects; and pooled ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) controlling for within-cluster 
(i.e., within-firm) correlation (Maury and Pajuste, 2005, Chen et al., 2009b). Robust standard 
                                                 
9 Selected results are presented in this section.  Detailed results are available upon request.  
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errors are calculated to reflect correlations between observations due to common firm 
characteristics. We also run ordinary least squares regressions year-by-year with robust-
heterogeneity standard errors to circumvent the issue of  serial correlation. In each of  the 
alternative models, the OW and OW2 variables have the expected signs but weaker statistical 
significance in certain cases. 
4.4.3 Firm Value Measures 
,QVWHDGRI 7RELQ·V4ZHFRQVLGHU WKHPDUNHW WRERRN UDWLRDV DQDOWHUQDWLYHPHDVXUHRI  ILUP
value. Market value of  equity is defined as the sum of  the outstanding tradable and non-tradable 
share values. In the same way as we adjusted 7RELQ·V4we discount non-tradable shares by 80 
per cent and 70 per cent to represent their illiquidity discount. We replicated the core tests with 
Market to Book VXEVWLWXWLQJIRU7RELQ·V4with the same general results.  
4.4.4 Alternative Ownership Wedge Proxies 
It is possible that the way we measure Ownership Wedge influenced our main findings. To test 
the robustness of  our results, we follow Laeven and Levine (2008) and construct a ´FDVK-flow 
UDWLRµDQG´GLVSHUVLRQUDWLRµ by using voting rights rather than cash flow rights to proxy for OW.  
The results are presented in Table VIII. Similar to using OW, the coefficients for cash flow and 
dispersion ratio are significantly positive in the linear term and significantly negative in the 
quadratic term.  
4.4.5 Effect of  the Split Share Structure Reform  
A large number of  Chinese firms have tradable and non-tradable shares. Non-tradable shares are 
not freely traded and can only be transferred with regulatory approval. Most non-tradable shares 
are held by the state or state-owned enterprises (SOE). Shareholders of  non-tradable shares are 
entitled to exactly the same voting and cash flow rights as shareholders of  tradable shares. 
However, shareholders of  non-tradable shares cannot benefit from price appreciation because 
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selling is not permitted. Before 2005, around two-thirds of  listed shares were non-tradable.  
There could be severe conflicts of  interest between tradable and non-tradable 
shareholders and share price maximisation may not be pursued to the full extent as tradable 
shareholders would like. In addition, when the proportion of  tradable shares is small in relation 
to total outstanding stock, share prices can be easily manipulated by traders (Li et al. 2011). To 
address these issues, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) launched a share 
structure reform at the end of  year 2005 with the intention of  converting non-tradable shares 
into tradable shares. Most companies have now completed the reform, with the exception of  
those firms that had multi-year lock-up periods for non-tradable shares.  
The split share structure reform may have important implications in our setting. 
Specifically, the presence of  non-tradable shares exacerbates expropriation and collusion in two 
ways.  First, the largest shareholder with non-tradable shares will not be able to benefit from any 
capital gain in the secondary market.  Therefore, the incentive to extract private benefits at the 
cost of  the company is higher for non-tradable controlling shareholders. Second, other large 
shareholders who hold non-tradable shares will have little incentive to monitor and more likely 
to collude given they will not benefit from a rise in firm value. Therefore, it is expected that 
reducing the proportion of  non-tradable shares in a company would weaken incentives for 
collusion and enhance monitoring activity.  In other words, a weaker nonlinear relationship is 
expected.   
To examine the potential effect of  the split share structure reform, we split the sample 
into pre- and post-periods and re-run our tests.  Table IX reports the results.  In both periods, 
there is still evidence of  collusion when the ownership wedge is higher.  However, the strength 
of  the relationship is weaker in the latter period.  It appears that the reforms made some 
progress towards reducing the extent of  expropriation by large shareholders. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the impact of  multiple large shareholders on firm value. We hypothesize 
that, instead of  monitoring, large shareholders may collude to maximise their own wealth at the 
expense of  firm value. The tendency to monitor or collude depends upon the relative 
shareholdings among the largest shareholders (the Ownership Wedge).   
&RQVLVWHQW ZLWK RXU PRGHO·V SUHGLFWLRQs, we show that there is strong evidence of  a 
concave relationship between the Ownership Wedge and firm value in Chinese listed companies. 
When the controlling shareholder·Vholding is much larger than that of  other shareholders, firm 
value is an increasing function of  the relative holdings between the two largest shareholders (i.e., 
the ratio of  the second largest shareholder voting rights to WKHODUJHVWVKDUHKROGHU·VYRWLQJULJKWV
However, as the Ownership Wedge narrows, firm value falls.  
Prior research has found that multiple large shareholders are able to increase firm value 
via monitoring. Our finding that large shareholders may actually collude with each other has 
implications for minority shareholders and board members who are seeking new financing. We 
find that ownership structures with large shareholders who are not too similar in the size of  
holdings appear to be optimal. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Theoretical Analysis 
A.1 Model Setup 
We propose a simple model to reflect the competing scenarios described in the main text 
and this allows us to examine the relationship between large shareholders and their effect on 
firm value. The model has foundations in Burkart et al. (1997), and we extend it to a more 
general setting. Specifically, there are two large shareholders: ܵଵ௦௧ and ܵଶ௡ௗ who hold a fraction, ߙ  and ߚ  respectively, of  the ILUP·s equity. All other shareholders hold the remaining equity, ሺ ? െ ߙ െ ߚሻ.  The firm has four potential projects (A, B, C, and Zero) with payoffs given below. 
Projects  
Shareholders  
A B C Zero ܵଵ௦௧ ܾଵ ܾଵ െ ܾଶ Ƚȫ 0 ܵଶ௡ௗ 0 ܾଶ Ⱦȫ 0 
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ܵ௢௧௛௘௥ 0 0 ȫ െ ߙȫ െ ߚȫ 0 ஺ܵ௟௟ ܾଵ ܾଵ ȫ 0 
 
Project A pays a private benefit,ܾଵ, to the controlling shareholder (ܵଵ௦௧), and zero cash 
flow to everyone else. Project B pays private benefits to the first and second largest shareholders, 
and zero cash flow to all others. Project C pays no private benefits and the payoff  is proportional 
to the fractional investment in the firm. Project Zero has a zero cash flow and is known to all 
parties.  
Projects A, B and C cannot be distinguished a priori. The largest shareholder can 
distinguish between A, B and C with probability ݁ by incurring a non-verifiable cost,݁ଶȀ ?. We 
assume there are no agency issues between the largest shareholder and the manager given their 
controlling power. Similar to Burkart et al (1997), we assume the following monitoring strategy 
of  the second largest shareholder. If  the largest shareholder observes projects A, B, and C, the 
second largest shareholder can also do so with probability ݂  by incurring a non-verifiable 
monitoring cost, ݂ଶȀ ?. If  the largest shareholder remains uninformed, so does the second 
largest shareholder by default.  The choice of  project can be illustrated in a decision tree, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure A.1 demonstrates the choice of  project as follows. First, if  the controlling 
shareholder is uninformed, so is the second largest shareholder.  They agree and choose Project 
Zero.  Second, if  the controlling shareholder is informed and the second largest shareholder is 
uninformed, the controlling shareholder would choose Project A, which will provide a private 
benefit to the controlling shareholder only. Third, if  both controlling and second largest 
shareholders are informed, the second largest shareholder has two options. It can either choose 
to monitor the largest shareholder and ensure project C is chosen to maximise value for all 
shareholders. Alternatively, the two largest shareholders may collude and opt for shared private 
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benefits, project B. 
A.2 Model Solution 
We now solve the maximization problem for the first and second largest shareholders. 
*LYHQ WKH VHFRQG ODUJHVW VKDUHKROGHU·V H[SHFWHG HIIRUW݂, and the probability of  collusion, ܿ, 
between the two largest shareholders, the largest shareholder payoff  is solved as: 
௘ሾሺ ? െ ሻ݁ ? ൅ ݁ሼሺ ? െ ሻ݂ܾଵ ൅ ݂ሾሺ ? െ ሻܿߙߎ ൅ ܿሺܾଵ െ ܾଶሻሿሽ െ ݁ଶȀ ?]  (A.1) 
 
The first order condition is given by: 
݁ ൌ ܾଵ െ ܾଵ݂ ൅ ݂ሺܾଵ െ ܾଶሻܿ ൅ ߙ݂ߎሺ ? െ ܿሻ      (A.2) 
 
*LYHQWKHDQWLFLSDWHGOHYHORI WKHILUVWODUJHVWVKDUHKROGHU·VHIIRUW݁, and the probability 
of  collusion ܿ, the payoff  for the second shareholder is solved as: 
௙ሺ ? െ ሻ݁ ? ൅ ݁ሼሺ ? െ ሻ݂ ? ൅ ሾ݂ሺ ? െ ሻܿߚߎ ൅ ܿܾଶሿሽ െ ݂ଶȀ ?   (A.3) 
 
The first order condition is given by: 
݂ ൌ ݁ሺܾଶܿ ൅ ߚߎ െ ܿߚߎሻ.        (A.4) 
 
Use Equations 2 and 4 we solve for ݁ and݂: 
݁ ൌ ܾଵ െ ௕భሺ௕భି௕భ௖ା௕మ௖ିఈ௽ା௖ఈ௽ሻሺ௕మ௖ାሺଵି௖ሻఉ௽ሻଵିሺି௕భାሺ௕భି௕మሻ௖ାሺଵି௖ሻఈ௽ሻሺ௕మ௖ାሺଵି௖ሻఉ௽ሻǡ     (A.5)  ൌ ୠభሺୠమୡାሺଵିୡሻஒஈሻଵିሺିୠభାሺୠభିୠమሻୡାሺଵିୡሻ஑ஈሻሺୠమୡାሺଵିୡሻஒஈሻ     (A.6) 
 
To value the equity of  the firm, we consider the expected public payoff  to shareholders, 
which is equal to the probability of  project C being chosen multiplied by its payoff.  This is 
because projects A, B, and Zero provide no public value.  Therefore, the equity value is given by: 
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ܸ ൌ ݂݁ሺ ? െ ܿሻߎ         (A.7) 
 
In order to analyze the effect of  large shareholder collusion on equity value, we make the 
following assumptions: 
Assumption 1:  ݎ ൌ ߚȀߙ           (A.8) 
 
The variable, , which is bounded below by zero and above by one, is the probability of  
collusion.  In the context of  this research, we assume that larger shareholdings equate to more 
bargaining power.  Therefore, the probability of  collusion is determined by the relative size of  
shareholding between the second (ߚ) and the first largest shareholder (ߙ). We believe that ݎ is a 
good proxy for collusion because, as the second largest shareholder's investment grows, their 
incentive and power to extract private rents via collusion increases.  From the largest 
VKDUHKROGHU·V SHUVSHFWLYH LW LV EHWWHU WR FROOXGH ZLWK DQRWKHU SRZHrful large shareholder to 
extract private benefits than to have them acting as monitor10.    
Assumption 2: 
 ଶ ൌ ஒ஑ାஒ ܾଵ          (A.9) 
The variable, ܾଶ is the private benefit received by the second largest shareholder when 
they choose to collude with the controlling owner. To ensure parsimony and to proxy for relative 
bargaining power, we make a further assumption that the first and second largest shareholders 
share the private benefit, ܾଵ, between them according to their relative shareholding size. 
With these two assumptions, we are able to assess the impact of  the Ownership Wedge 
                                                 
10 The importance of  the relative size of  key players in determining whether they collude has been studied in other 
economic contexts.  For example, industrial organization theory shows that the relationship between market power 
and firm size inequality follows a U shape pattern. When firm size inequality is low (i.e., symmetric size among the 
key players), tacit collusion is more likely to happen and is stable to sustain (see, for example, Barla, 2000). 
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on firm value.  To facilitate the analysis we express ߚ in terms of  ߙ, and use ݎ to measure the 
Ownership Wedge.  
ߚ ൌ ݎߙ           (A.10) 
Substituting equations (5), (6), (8), (9), and (10) into equation (7), we have our final 
solution for firm value, which is expressed in terms of  the Ownership Wedge, ݎ, the controlling 
RZQHU·VKROGLQJߙ, the private benefit, ଵ, and cashflow to the company, ȫ, in the event when 
no private benefits are extracted. 
ܸ ൌ ሺଵି௥ሻ௽௕భమሺሺଵି௥ሻ௥ఈ௽ାೝమഀ್భഀశೝഀ ሻሺଵିሺሺଵି௥ሻ௥ఈ௽ାೝమഀ್భഀశೝഀ ሻሺሺଵି௥ሻఈ௽ି௕భା௥ሺ௕భିೝഀ್భഀశೝഀሻሻሻమ    (A.11) 
Our interest lies in finding the relationship between the Ownership Wedge and firm 
value.  We state this in the following proposition: 
Proposition A.1. From assumptions 1 and 2, firm value is a concave function of the Ownership 
Wedge (߲ଶ௥௥ܸ ൏  ?ሻ.    
 
Given the complexity of  Equation (11), we use numerical methods to arrive at a solution 
for ܸ.11 Figure A.2 plots firm value ܸ against the Ownership Wedge, r.  To illustrate, we use the 
following values for the parameters: ߎ ൌ  ?ǡ ଵܾ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, and ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. This means that for Project 
C, the firm will receive 1 unit of  cash flow; the size of  the private benefit, ܾଵ, is 60% of  the cash 
IORZDQGWKHFRQWUROOLQJRZQHU·VVKDUHKROGLQJLV 
Figure A.2 shows that, as the investment of  the second largest shareholder gets higher, 
firm value increases to a maximum and then falls.  This suggests that there is a trade-off  between 
monitoring and collusion behavior by the second largest shareholder as the relative ownership 
stake increases. 
                                                 
11  A wider range of  values for the key variables are also considered to ensure robustness of  our theoretical 
predictions.  These results are available on request from the authors.  
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To develop our analysis further, we examine the case when there is no possibility of  
collusion and the second largest shareholder can only monitor the behavior of  the controlling 
owner.  This could happen in environments where minority shareholder rights are strong. Firm 
value, V, is determined as before and with the same parameters: ߎ ൌ  ?ǡ ଵܾ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, and ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 
The only difference is that the probability of  collusion, ܿ, is set to zero.   
Figure A.3 clearly shows that when there is no possibility of  collusion between the two 
largest shareholders, the second largest shareholder will always add value to the company.  This is 
consistent with earlier research in which the positive impact of  multiple large shareholders is 
documented (e.g., Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 
2008).    
Overall, our theoretical analysis shows that the relationship between the Ownership 
Wedge and firm performance is concave when there is a possibility of  collusion between large 
investors.12 
  
                                                 
12 In unreported analysis, we carry out robustness checks by first varying the effect of  WKH FRQWUROOLQJ RZQHU·V
investment, ߙ. Second we study the effect of  varying b.  We show that the nonlinear relationship between firm value 
and relative size holds under a wide range of  parameterizations.  Results are available on request.  
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Figure A.1. Project Decision Tree 
This figure presents the decision tree for project selection.  ଵܵ௦௧andܵଶ௡ௗ refer to the first and second largest 
shareholders respectively. 
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Figure A.2. Firm Value and the Ownership Wedge 
 
This figure plots firm value, V, against the Ownership Wedge, r, where V is obtained using Equation (11) with the 
following numerical values for the parameters: ߎ ൌ  ?ǡ ܾ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, and ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. 
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Figure A.3. Firm Value and the Ownership Wedge without Collusion 
This figure plots the firm value and the Ownership Wedge. Firm value, V, is determined by Equations (5), (6) , (7), 
setting the probability of collusion ݎ ൌ  ? and the other parameters: ߎ ൌ  ?ǡ ܾ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, and ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?.  
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Appendix B. Definition of  Variables 
Variables Description of  Variables 
7RELQ·V4 The ratio of  market value of  total assets to replacement cost of  total assets. The 
market value of  total assets is the sum of  the market value of  total outstanding 
shares and book value of  total liability. Replacement costs of  total asset are 
approximated by book value of  total assets. The market value of  total outstanding 
shares is the sum of  the market value of  tradable shares and the market value of  
non-tradable shares. The market value of  tradable shares is the sum of  market value 
of  tradable A shares and the market value of  tradable B or H shares if  firms issue B 
or H shares. Given the illiquidity discount of  non-tradable shares, the price of  non-
tradable shares is approximated by using 20% and 30% of  stock price of  
corresponding tradable A shares. The market value of  non-tradable shares is the 
product of  the non-tradable shares price and total number of  non-tradable shares. 
7KHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ7RELQ·V4GHQRWHGDV7RELQ·V41 DQG7RELQ·V42. 
M/B Market-to-book ratio, which is defined as market value of  total equity divided by the 
book value of  total equity. The market value of  total outstanding shares is 
constructed LQ D VLPLODU ZD\ WR WKDW IRU 7RELQ·V 4 FDOFXODWLRQ DERYH  7KH
corresponding non-tradable discounted M/Bs are denoted as M/B1 and M/B2.  
OW1 The ratio of  shares held by the second largest shareholder to that held by the first 
largest shareholder, . 
OW2 The ratio of  shares held by the second largest shareholder to the sum of  both first 
largest and second largest shareholder, . 
OW3 The ratio of  the sum of  shares held by the second and third largest shareholder to 
the shares held by the first largest shareholder, . 
OW4 The ratio of  the sum of  shares held by the second and third largest shareholder to 
the sum of  shares held by the first, second, and third largest shareholders 
. 
VOTING_1ST The proportion of  shares held by the first largest shareholder 
VOTING_2ND The proportion of  shares held by the second largest shareholder 
DUM_LS_N Dummy variable equal to one if  the shares held by the second largest shareholder are 
at least N per cent of  total shares outstanding, zero otherwise. 
DUM_STATE Dummy variable equal to one if  the first largest shareholder is a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), zero otherwise. 
IDSAME Dummy variable equal to one if  the identity of  the first largest shareholder is the 
same as the identity of  the second largest shareholder, zero otherwise. We classify as 
identity as 1) SOE; 2) Financial Institutions; 3) Corporate Owners; and 4) Individual 
Investors.  
Cash-flow ratio One minus the ratio of  second largest shareholder voting rights to first largest 
shareholder voting rights.  
Dispersion ratio The difference between the voting rights of  the first largest shareholder and second 
largest shareholder, divided by the sum of  the voting rights of  the first and second 
largest shareholders. 
FIRMSIZE The natural logarithm of  total sales. 
LEVERAGE The ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. 
GROWTH Growth rate in sales, defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. 
CAPEX Capital expenditure, defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
TANGIBILITY The ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. 
7RELQ·V4(-t) The t-\HDUODJRI 7RELQ·V4 
Industry Dummies Dummy variables to represent 13 different industries, based on an official industry 
classification standard stipulated by CSRC (the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission) 13 . Financial firms are excluded because of  the different nature of  
investment for these firms. 
Year Dummies Dummy variables to represent each year in the sample period.  
                                                 
13  They are 1) Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry & Fishing; 2) Mining; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Utilities; 5) 
Construction; 6) Transportation & Warehouse; 7) Information Technology; 8) Wholesale & Retailing; 9) Finance& 
Insurance; 10) Real Estate; 11) Social Services; 12) Communications & Cultural; 13) Conglomerates.  
1 2 1/OW Votes Votes 
2 2 1 2/( )OW Votes Votes Votes 
3 2 3 1( ) /OW Votes Votes Votes 
4 2 3 1 2 3( ) /( )OW Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes   
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RPT Dummy variable equal to one if  there are related party transactions carried out 
between a listed company and its largest shareholders (or affiliations), zero otherwise. 
BOARDSIZE The total number of  directors on the board 
BOARD_IND The percentage of  independent directors on the board. 
DUALITY Dummy variable equal to one if  the CEO and Chairman are the same person, zero 
otherwise. 
DUM_COMMITTEE Dummy variable equal to one if  a listed company has all four committees (audit, 
nomination, strategy, and remuneration), zero otherwise. 
DUM_BH Dummy variable equal to one if  a listed company has B or H-shares in its capital 
structure, zero otherwise. 
DUM_BIG4 Dummy variable equal to one if  a firm hires one of  the Big Four accounting firms ( 
i.e., Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young) as its external 
auditor, zero otherwise. 
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Table I Ownership Structure of  Chinese Listed Companies 
 
This table reports the ownership structure of  Chinese listed companies in the period 2003 to 2011. Widely-held 
firms have no shareholder with at least 10% (5%) voting rights. Firms with one controlling shareholder have one 
large shareholder with at least 10%(5%) of  the voting rights. Firms with multiple large shareholders have at least two 
large shareholders with at least 10% (5%) of  the voting rights. 
 
 
Ownership Structure 
10% voting rights threshold 5% voting rights threshold 
Number of  
Firms 
% sample Number of  
Firms 
% sample 
Widely Held 157 1.40% 17 0.15% 
One Controlling Shareholder 7,626 67.84% 5,701 50.72% 
Multiple Large Shareholders 3,458 30.76% 5,523 49.13% 
Of  which 2 large 2,874 25.57% 3,438 30.58% 
Of  which 3 large 508 4.52% 1,426 12.69% 
Of  which 4 or more large 76 0.68% 659 5.86% 
Total 11,241 100.00% 11,241 100.00% 
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Table II Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics of  all variables used in this paper. The sample period is from 2003 to 2011. 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix B.  All variables are winsorized at the 1th and 99th percentile values. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
TRELQ·VQ1 11,241 1.6897 1.2422 1.2964 0.5997 8.8598 
TRELQ·VQ2 11,241 1.7535 1.2957 1.3317 0.6504 9.1230 
VOTING_1ST 11,241 0.3779 0.3553 0.1609 0.0922 0.7562 
VOTING_2ND 11,241 0.0768 0.0490 0.0723 0.0017 0.2861 
OW1 11,241 0.2794 0.1558 0.2879 0.0027 0.9826 
OW2 11,241 0.1835 0.1348 0.1570 0.0027 0.4956 
OW3 11,241 0.3990 0.2319 0.4079 0.0048 1.6559 
OW4 11,241 0.2335 0.1882 0.1828 0.0048 0.6235 
DUM_STATE 11,241 0.6247 1.0000 0.4842 0.0000 1.0000 
IDSAME 11,241 0.4065 0.0000 0.4912 0.0000 1.0000 
FIRMSIZE 11,241 20.9130 20.8988 1.5581 16.2519 24.9402 
LEVERAGE 11,241 0.0795 0.0334 0.1059 0.0000 0.4702 
GROWTH 11,241 0.2516 0.1476 0.6948 -0.7524 5.1711 
CAPEX 11,241 0.0558 0.0371 0.0573 0.0001 0.2702 
TANGIBILITY 11,241 0.2932 0.2644 0.1896 0.0026 0.7880 
BOARDSIZE 11,005 9.3922 9.000 1.9831 3.0000 15.0000 
BOARD_IND 11,005 0.3522 0.3300 0.0540 0.000 0.5600 
DUALITY 11,005 0.1218 0.0000 0.3271 0.0000 1.0000 
DUM_COMMITTEE 11,005 0.6507 1.0000 0.4767 0.0000 1.0000 
DUM_BH 11,005 0.0994 0.000 0.2992 0.000 1.0000 
DUM_BIG4 11,005 0.0716 0.0000 0.2578 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table III Firm Value and the Ownership Wedge 
 
This table presents the results of  OLS regressions with industry and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
7RELQ·V 4 7KH VDPSOH SHULRG LV IURP  WR  DQG WKH VDPSOH FRQVLVWV RI  DOO OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV H[FOXGLQJ
financial firms. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively. Turning points are calculated by taking the first derivative of  the 
linear and quadratic terms of  OW in each model, setting the derivative to zero, and solving for OW.  For example, in 
Model (1), the first derivative of  the OW terms is .280 - .654OW1. Setting this to zero and solving for OW1 gives a 
turning point of  0.4281. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
 Dependent Variable: TRELQ·VQ 
Constant 7.875*** 7.861*** 7.823*** 7.815*** 
 (0.229) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) 
OW1 0.280**    
 (0.115)    
OW12 -0.327**    
 (0.130)    
OW2  0.630***   
  (0.225)   
OW22  -1.297***   
  (0.484)   
OW3   0.261***  
   (0.070)  
OW32   -0.184***  
   (0.051)  
OW4    0.590*** 
    (0.185) 
OW42    -0.886*** 
    (0.336) 
DUM_STATE -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.111*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
FIRMSIZE -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.336*** -0.337*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
LEVERAGE -0.929*** -0.929*** -0.929*** -0.930*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
GROWTH 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
CAPEX 0.248 0.243 0.247 0.238 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) 
TANGIBILITY 0.155* 0.154* 0.154* 0.153* 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 11,241 11,241 11,241 11,241 
R-squared 0.414 0.414 0.415 0.414 
Adj. R-squared 0.412 0.412 0.413 0.413 
Turning Point 42.81% 24.29% 70.92% 33.30% 
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Table IV Firm Value and the Presence of  a Second Large Shareholder 
7KLVWDEOHSUHVHQWVWKHUHVXOWVRI 2/6UHJUHVVLRQZLWKLQGXVWU\DQG\HDUIL[HGHIIHFWV7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLV7RELQ·V4The sample period is from 2003 to 2011 and the sample 
consists of  all listed companies excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B.  All variables are winsorized at the 1th and 99th percentile values. Robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Constant 7.752*** 7.783*** 7.870*** 7.911*** 8.001*** 8.036*** 7.980*** 7.962*** 
 (0.223) (0.224) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228) (0.229) (0.225) (0.224) 
DUM_LS_05 0.165***        
 (0.026)        
DUM_LS_1  0.125***       
  (0.022)       
DUM_LS_2   0.042*      
   (0.021)      
DUM_LS_3    0.009     
    (0.020)     
DUM_LS_5     -0.052***    
     (0.020)    
DUM_LS_10      -0.099***   
      (0.022)   
DUM_LS_15       -0.093***  
       (0.025)  
DUM_LS_20        -0.136*** 
        (0.028) 
DUM_STATE -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.116*** -0.120*** -0.131*** -0.135*** -0.129*** -0.124*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
FIRMSIZE -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.339*** -0.341*** -0.342*** -0.341*** -0.340*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
LEVERAGE -0.929*** -0.933*** -0.926*** -0.926*** -0.921*** -0.916*** -0.923*** -0.929*** 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.123) (0.122) 
GROWTH 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
CAPEX 0.234 0.230 0.238 0.249 0.251 0.247 0.258 0.243 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172) 
TANGIBILITY 0.155* 0.159** 0.156* 0.155* 0.156* 0.158* 0.157* 0.158* 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 11,241 11,241 11,241 11,241 11,241 11,241 11,241 11,241 
R-squared 0.415 0.415 0.414 0.414 0.414 0.415 0.415 0.415 
Adj. R-squared 0.413 0.413 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.413 0.413 0.413 
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Table V Firm Value and the Identity of  Large Shareholders 
 
This table presents the results of  OLS regressions with industry and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
7RELQ·V 41. The sample period is from 2003 to 2011 and the sample consists of  all listed companies excluding 
financial firms. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. All variables are winsorized at the 1th and 99th 
percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
Constant 7.901*** 7.884*** 7.852*** 7.841*** 
 (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) 
OW1 0.373***    
 (0.119)    
OW12 -0.403***    
 (0.133)    
OW2  0.799***   
  (0.233)   
OW22  -1.538***   
  (0.494)   
OW3   0.322***  
   (0.072)  
OW32   -0.214***  
   (0.052)  
OW4    0.725*** 
    (0.192) 
OW42    -1.029*** 
    (0.343) 
IDSAME -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.071*** -0.071*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
DUM_STATE -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.122*** -0.123*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
FIRMSIZE -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.337*** -0.337*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
LEVERAGE -0.927*** -0.927*** -0.927*** -0.928*** 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) 
GROWTH 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
CAPEX 0.244 0.237 0.242 0.231 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) 
TANGIBILITY 0.156* 0.155* 0.156* 0.154* 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Industry 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 11,241 11,241 11,241 11,241 
R-squared 0.415 0.415 0.415 0.415 
Adj. R-squared 0.413 0.413 0.413 0.413 
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Table VI Expropriation and the Ownership Wedge 
 
This table presents the results of  the relationship between the likelihood of  expropriation by the largest 
shareholders and the Ownership Wedge. We use related party transactions conducted by the largest shareholders 
(and its affiliations) as the proxy of  the expropriation. The methodology is panel data PROBIT Model. The sample 
period is from 2003 to 2011 including all listed companies excluding financial companies. The dependent variable is 
RPT, which is a dummy variable and it takes one if  there is related party transactions carried out between a listed 
company and its largest shareholders (and its affiliations), takes zero otherwise. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix B. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th per cent values. Robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (3) (5) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
Constant -4.080*** -3.994*** -4.006*** -3.923*** 
 (0.555) (0.556) (0.553) (0.554) 
OW1 -2.655***    
 (0.331)    
OW12 1.663***    
 (0.346)    
OW2  -4.380***   
  (0.691)   
OW22  4.185***   
  (1.358)   
OW3   -1.845***  
   (0.201)  
OW32   0.714***  
   (0.134)  
OW4    -3.156*** 
    (0.571) 
OW42    1.627* 
    (0.921) 
DUM_STATE 0.120** 0.115* 0.109* 0.108* 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
FIRMSIZE 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
LEVERAGE 0.297 0.297 0.324 0.317 
 (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) 
GROWTH 0.064** 0.064** 0.066** 0.066** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
CAPEX 0.319 0.337 0.335 0.357 
 (0.424) (0.424) (0.424) (0.424) 
TANGIBILITY 0.257 0.259 0.255 0.256 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) 
BOARDSIZE 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
BOARD_IND -0.144 -0.133 -0.136 -0.147 
 (0.453) (0.454) (0.453) (0.453) 
DUALITY -0.111 -0.111 -0.112 -0.112 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
DUM_BH -0.367** -0.377** -0.364** -0.373** 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.149) 
DUM_COMMITT
EE 
-0.061 -0.061 -0.057 -0.055 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
DUM_BIG4 -0.359*** -0.364*** -0.370*** -0.375*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 11,005 11,005 11,005 11,005 
Number of  Firms 1,379 1,379 1,379 1,379 
 
  
 
 
 
7KLVDUWLFOHLVSURWHFWHGE\FRS\ULJKW$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG   
 
 
Table VII Firm Value and the Ownership Wedge ² System GMM estimation 
 
7KLVWDEOHSUHVHQWVWKHUHJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVRI 7RELQ·V41 on various ownership wedge and control variables by using 
system GMM model specification. The sample period is from 2003 to 2011 and the sample consists of  all listed 
companies excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. All variables are winsorized at the 
1th and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
Constant 6.463*** 6.404*** 6.380*** 6.319*** 
 (0.564) (0.560) (0.534) (0.548) 
OW1 0.817**    
 (0.351)    
OW12 -1.001***    
 (0.371)    
OW2  2.021***   
  (0.689)   
OW22  -4.500***   
  (1.396)   
OW3   0.422**  
   (0.213)  
OW32   -0.284*  
   (0.151)  
OW4    1.645*** 
    (0.585) 
OW42    -2.811*** 
    (1.017) 
72%,1·64(-1) 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.129*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
72%,1·64(-2) 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
72%,1·64(-3) 0.289*** 0.287*** 0.282*** 0.277*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
DUM_STATE -0.047 -0.049 -0.039 -0.040 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
FIRMSIZE -0.292*** -0.289*** -0.288*** -0.286*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
LEVERAGE -1.367*** -1.309*** -1.306*** -1.245*** 
 (0.253) (0.253) (0.254) (0.251) 
GROWTH 0.053 0.051 0.049 0.066 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) 
CAPEX 0.716 0.535 0.482 0.500 
 (0.504) (0.502) (0.510) (0.508) 
TANGIBILITY 0.689*** 0.623*** 0.630*** 0.615*** 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 7,001 7,001 7,001 7,001 
Number of  Firms 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
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Table VIII Firm Value and the Alternative Ownership Wedge Measures 
 
This table presents the results of  OLS regressions with industry and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
7RELQ·V 41. The sample period is from 2003 to 2011 and the sample consists of  all listed companies excluding 
financial firms. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Year Dummies are dummy variables and represent 
different years. All variables are winsorized at the 1th and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
Constant 7.829*** 7.852*** 
 (0.226) (0.225) 
Cash-flow ratio 0.373**  
 (0.155)  
Cash-flow ratio_SQ -0.327**  
 (0.130)  
Dispersion ratio  0.333** 
  (0.138) 
Dispersion ratio_SQ  -0.324*** 
  (0.121) 
DUM_STATE -0.117*** -0.116*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
FIRMSIZE -0.338*** -0.338*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
LEVERAGE -0.929*** -0.929*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) 
GROWTH 0.061*** 0.060*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
CAPEX 0.248 0.243 
 (0.173) (0.173) 
TANGIBILITY 0.155* 0.154* 
 (0.081) (0.081) 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES 
   
Observations 11,241 11,241 
R-squared 0.414 0.414 
Adj. R-squared 0.412 0.412 
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Table IX Split Share Structure Reform 
 
This table presents the results of  OLS regressions with industry and year fixed effects for period of  before (2003-
2006) and after (2007-2011) the split share structure reform respectively 7KH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH LV 7RELQ·V 41. 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. All variables are winsorized at the 1th and 99th percentile values. 
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates] significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 BEFORE AFTER 
Constant 4.402*** 4.402*** 4.387*** 4.385*** 11.276*** 11.256*** 11.183*** 11.182*** 
 (0.275) (0.276) (0.275) (0.276) (0.321) (0.321) (0.321) (0.321) 
OW1 0.266**    0.366**    
 (0.112)    (0.184)    
OW12 -0.294**    -0.313    
 (0.133)    (0.211)    
OW2  0.458**    0.724**   
  (0.214)    (0.363)   
OW22  -0.892*    -1.113   
  (0.469)    (0.787)   
OW3   0.162**    0.409***  
   (0.069)    (0.111)  
OW32   -0.109**    -0.236***  
   (0.055)    (0.084)  
OW4    0.353**    0.688** 
    (0.174)    (0.303) 
OW42    -0.511*    -0.714 
    (0.303)    (0.556) 
DUM_STATE -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.147*** -0.146*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
FIRMSIZE -0.170*** -0.170*** -0.169*** -0.170*** -0.430*** -0.430*** -0.427*** -0.428*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
LEVERAGE 0.428** 0.429** 0.431** 0.429** -1.468*** -1.467*** -1.469*** -1.467*** 
 (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
GROWTH 0.034* 0.034* 0.034* 0.034* 0.063** 0.063** 0.062** 0.062** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
CAPEX -0.158 -0.161 -0.154 -0.159 0.233 0.223 0.210 0.202 
 (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.288) 
TANGIBILITY 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.150 0.149 0.151 0.148 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
Industry 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935 6,306 6,306 6,306 6,306 
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.398 0.398 0.399 0.399 
Adj. R-squared 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.395 0.395 0.396 0.396 
 
 
 
